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1. Introduction
Tropical linear algebra is a relatively new area of mathematics, having only
been studied in depth since around 1960. Cuninghame-Green was one of the
pioneers in the area, with many of his results being presented in [5]. Since then, a
number of mathematicians have further developed the theory and applications
of tropical linearity, and it has enjoyed prominence and influence in several
mathematical areas such as linear algebra, algebraic geometry and combinatorial
optimisation. Tropical linear algebra gives us the ability to write seemingly non-
linear problems in a linear fashion using tropical linear operators, allowing an
algebraic encoding of many combinatorial problems and providing a framework
with which some discrete problems can be modelled [3, 4].
Optimisation problems over tropical linear algebra have been studied since
1970’s and 1980’s: see, e.g., K. Zimmermann [23] and U. Zimmermann [24]. A
crucial step was made by Butkovicˇ [4], who developed a bisection scheme for
solving tropical linear programming. Krivulin [14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21] made
a big contribution to the area by solving a multitude of what we term as trop-
ical pseudolinear and tropical pseudoquadratic optimisation problems, albeit
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with special constraints. The connection between tropical linear algebra and
mean payoff games was discovered by Akian, Gaubert and Guterman [1], and
this connection was further applied to tropical linear-fractional programming
by Gaubert et al. [12]. The present paper aims to develop the tropical pseudo-
linear and pseudoquadratic optimisation by considering a more general form of
constraints and applying to it the connection to mean-payoff games discovered
in [1], following the approach of [12].
We now introduce the tropical linear algebra formally. Tropical semiring
is the set Rmax = R ∪ {−∞} equipped with the operations (⊕,⊗) defined by
a⊕b = max(a, b) and a⊗b = a+b. Algebraically, (Rmax,⊕,⊗) is a commutative
idempotent semifield, meaning in particular that ⊕ and ⊗ are commutative,
associative and satisfy the distributive law. Note that the ⊕ identity is −∞ and
the ⊗ identity is 0. Many of the tools and operations used in usual linear algebra
can be applied in tropical linear algebra. An important difference with rings is
that (R∪{−∞},⊕) does not form a group and thus there is no straightforward
subtraction in tropical algebra. Symmetrization over tropical algebra has been
known for a long time [3], being a kind of substitute for this shortcoming. Also
we can use the idempotent property of ⊕: for all x ∈ Rmax x⊕ x = x.
The definition of ⊕ and ⊗ is then extended to include matrices and vectors.
Suppose A = (aij) B = (bij) C = (cij) ∈ Rmax. When A and B are of the same
size, C = A⊕B if cij = aij⊕bij for all i, j. For matrices A and B of compatible
size, D = A⊗B if dij =
⊕
aik ⊗ bkj = maxk(aik + bkj).
The unit matrix, I, is defined as a square matrix whose diagonal entries are
0, with all other off-diagonal entries being −∞.
For a ∈ R ∪ {−∞} ∪ {+∞} we define its conjugate as −a if a ∈ R, +∞ if
a = −∞, and −∞ if a = +∞. This definition is easily extended to vectors: for
a column vector x = (xi) its conjugate is defined as a row vector x
− = (x−i ).
The ideas and methods of tropical linear algebra and mean-payoff games will
help us to solve the following main problems considered in this paper.
Problem 1.1 (Pseudolinear optimisation with two-sided constraints). Given
p ∈ Rnmax, q ∈ (R ∪ {+∞})n, U, V ∈ Rm×nmax , b, d ∈ Rmmax, find
min
x∈Rn
x− ⊗ p⊕ q− ⊗ x
subject to U ⊗ x⊕ b ≤ V ⊗ x⊕ d.
(1)
and at least one finite x ∈ Rn that attains the minimum.
Problem 1.2 (Pseudoquadratic optimisation with two-sided constraints). Given
C ∈ Rn×nmax , p ∈ Rnmax, q ∈ (R ∪ {+∞})n, U, V ∈ Rm×nmax , b, d ∈ Rmmax, find
min
x∈Rn
x− ⊗ C ⊗ x⊕ x− ⊗ p⊕ q− ⊗ x
subject to U ⊗ x⊕ b ≤ V ⊗ x⊕ d.
(2)
and at least one finite x ∈ Rn that attains the minimum.
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The problems with the same objective function as Problem 1.1 but more
special constraints were studied by Krivulin [15, 21] see also [14] and [22] where
the objective fuction is strongly related to the one in (1), but somewhat dif-
ferent. Problems with similar objective functions as in Problem 1.2 (in partic-
ular, containing the pseudoquadratic term x− ⊗ C ⊗ x) were also studied by
Krivulin [16, 19, 20]. However, the problems considered in these works have
more special constraints than Problems 1.1 and 1.2. In return for not most
general constraints, a comprehensive and concise description of both optimal
value and the whole solution set is offered in all of the above references.
In contrast to that approach, we are not interested to describe all solutions.
Although it is possible to achieve such a description following, for example, the
double description algorithm by Allamigeon et al. [2], it is much more compli-
cated than in the case of special systems of constraints, and we are not intending
to do it here.
As in the case of the tropical linear or tropical linear-fractional program-
ming [4, 12], there is a clear geometric motivation to consider the problems
posed above, since the constraint Ux⊕b ≤ V x⊕d is a general form of two-sided
tropical affine constraints, that is, such constraints that describe the tropical
polyhedra.
We now show how this type of pseudo-quadratic optimisation problem may
arise in practice, by considering an application to project scheduling, similar
to the one described by Krivulin [16, 19, 20], but also including disjunctive
constraints, which were not considered in those works.
Suppose a particular project involves a set of n activities that have to be
completed. Each activity has an initiation time xi and a completion time yi.
We define the time it takes to complete each activity to be its flow time, given
by yi − xi.
We have “start-to-finish” constraints, that activities cannot be completed
until specified times have elapsed after the initiation of other constraints, and
that the activities are completed as soon as possible within these constraints.
This means that x and y should satisfy the inequalitiies xj + cij ≤ yi for all i
and j, where cij = −∞ if there is no such constraint for some i and j. For the
activity j to start as soon as possible, we should have maxj cij + xj = yi, and
hence we obtain yi−xi = −xi+maxj cij+xj for the flow time of task i. We will
be also interested to minimise pi − xi and xi − qi for each task i, which means
that we would like task i not to delay too much after qi and not to start too
much in advance before pi. Gathering all these constraints together and posing
the objective to minimise the greatest of all flow times and the time differences
pi − xi and xi − qi, we obtain the objective
min
x∈Rn
x− ⊗ C ⊗ x⊕ x− ⊗ p⊕ q− ⊗ x.
The starting times of the tasks may be subject to more constraints: in the
simplest case it may be required that bi ≤ xi ≤ di for some i and some bi, di ∈ R,
or that uij + xj ≤ xi for some i and j and uij ∈ R. However, we may also have
disjunctive constraints, where bi ≤ vij + xj , for some i and with bi, vij ∈ R,
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should hold at least for one j. Similarly, we may have that maxk(uik + xk) ≤
vij + xj , for some i with uik ∈ Rmax and vij ∈ R, should hold for at least one j.
This motivates considering the above objective function with constraint in the
form of two-sided tropical affine inequality
U ⊗ x⊕ b ≤ V ⊗ x⊕ d,
which can capture all the above mentioned constraints.
The rest of the paper will be organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall the
basic knowledge and facts about tropical linear algebra and mean-payoff games
that are needed for this paper. In Section 3 we formulate Problem 1.1 in terms
of the associated parametric mean-payoff game and present the certificates of
optimality and unboundedness in terms of this game. In Sections 4 and 5 we
develop the bisection and Newton schemes for solving Problem 1.1. Two versions
of the Newton scheme are given: one for the case of real data and the other
for the case of integer data. In Section 6 we give an example and describe the
numerical experiments, which we conducted upon implementing the Newton and
bisection schemes in MATLAB. Finally, in Section 7 we explain how most of our
results, including the Newton and bisection schemes, extend to pseudoquadratic
programming (Problem 1.2). However, efficient implementation of these schemes
for this problem will be developed in another publication.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Tropical linear algebra
Some of the main concepts of tropical linear algebra come from combinatorial
optimization [4].
With a matrix A ∈ (R ∪ {−∞})n×n we can associate a weighted digraph
DA = (N,E,w). It has the set of nodes N = {1, . . . , n}, set of arcs E ⊆ N ×N
such that (i, j) ∈ E if and only if aij 6= −∞, and weight function w : E → R
defined by w(i, j) = aij . Vice versa, if we are given a weighted digraph D with
n nodes, we can associate with it a matrix AD ∈ (R ∪ {−∞})n×n, along the
same lines.
One important player in tropical linear algebra is the maximum cycle mean,
ρ(A). Given a matrix A ∈ (R ∪ −∞)n×n, we define
ρ(A) = max
σ
w(A, σ)
l(σ)
.
Here, σ denotes an elementary cycle. Also if we have σ = (i1 . . . iki1) then
w(A, σ) = ai1i2 ⊗ai2i3 ⊗ . . .⊗aiki1 is the weight of σ = (i1 . . . iki1) and l(σ) = k
is the length of the cycle σ. Note that ρ(A) is well defined for any matrix A,
and ρ(A) = −∞ if and only if DA is acyclic.
The importance of ρ(A) is due to the following. On the one hand, in the usual
linear algebra, the behaviour of some iterative algorithms crucially depends on
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the existence and properties of (I −A)−1. In the tropical linear algebra, this is
replaced with the Kleene star defined by the formal series
A∗ = I ⊕A⊕A2 ⊕ . . . .
This series converges and is equal to I ⊕A⊕ . . .⊕An−1 if and only if ρ(A) ≤ 0,
that is, if and only if there is no cycle in DA with a positive weight.
On the other hand, ρ(A) is crucial for the tropical eigenvector-eigenvalue
problem, or spectral problem in tropical linear algebra, which is the problem
of finding tropical eigenvalue λ and tropical eigenvector x 6= −∞ such that
A⊗ x = λ⊗ x. The connection between ρ(A) and the tropical spectral problem
is that the greatest tropical eigenvalue of any square matrix over Rmax is equal
to ρ(A), see [3, 4].
2.2. Dual Operators and Conjugates
Although there is no way of defining subtraction or matrix inversion in tropi-
cal linear algebra, we can overcome some of the difficulties this poses by defining
conjugates.
Dual operations are defined using the min plus algebra, which is the set
Rmin = R∪{+∞} equipped with operations (⊕′,⊗′) defined by a⊕′b = min(a, b)
and a⊗′ b = a+ b for all a, b ∈ Rmin.
Recalling the definition of scalar conjugate a→ a−, the conjugate of a matrix
A with entries in R ∪ {−∞}, denoted A], can be then defined by
(A])ij = a
−
ji ∀i, j.
Note that as A has entries in Rmax and can be used to perform max-plus mul-
tiplication, A] has entries in R ∪ {+∞} and can be used to perform min-plus
multiplication.
Below we will use the following property of scalar conjugates: for a, x ∈ Rmax
and b ∈ R∪ {+∞}, we have a⊗ x ≤ b if and only if x ≤ a− ⊗′ b. This property
can be easily extended to matrices:
Proposition 2.1 (e.g., [4] Theorem 1.6.25). Let A ∈ Rm×nmax , x ∈ Rnmax and
b ∈ (R ∪ {+∞})m. Then
A⊗ x ≤ b if and only if x ≤ A] ⊗′ b. (3)
The scalar and matrix conjugations discussed above were introduced by
Cuninghame-Green [5] and as residuations of max-plus scalar and matrix mul-
tiplication by Baccelli et al. [3].
2.3. Two-sided systems and min-max functions
The following is an obvious corollary of Proposition 2.1:
A⊗ x ≤ B ⊗ x if and only if x ≤ A# ⊗′ (B ⊗ x). (4)
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Here we assume that there is a finite entry in each row of B and each column
of A. With this assumption, the inequality x ≤ A# ⊗′ (B ⊗ x) can be written
as the following system of inequalities:
xj ≤ min
k : akj∈R
(−akj + max
l : bkl∈R
(bkl + xl)) ∀j = 1, .., n. (5)
The expression on the right-hand side of (5) can be written as the component
of a min-max function f(x) = A] ⊗′ (B ⊗ x), which we will also abbreviate to
A]Bx (thinking of A]⊗′ and B⊗ as operators):
fj(x) = min
k : akj∈R
(−akj + max
l : bkl∈R
(bkl + xl)). (6)
This function belongs to the class of topical functions investigated by Gaubert
and Gunawardena [11]. For the present paper, we will only need that the cycle-
time vector of f :
χ(f) = lim
k→∞
fk(0)
k
, (7)
exists and is well-defined [10]. Here, 0 denotes the vector with all components
equal to 0.
2.4. Mean Payoff Games
Consider the following zero-sum two player sequential game defined by two
m × n matrices A = (aij) and B = (bkl) over Rmax. The game is played on
the weighted directed graph (V,E,w) where the set of nodes V = [m] ∪ [n] is
the union of m nodes corresponding to the rows of the system A ⊗ x ≤ B ⊗ x
and n nodes corresponding to the variables. The arc set E contains 1) the
arcs (k, l) for which bkl ∈ R and 2) the arcs (j, i) for which aij ∈ R, and these
arcs are weighted by w(k, l) = bkl and w(j, i) = −aij respectively. The nodes
in [m] are the nodes at which player Max is active, and the nodes in [n] are
the nodes at which player Min is active. The game starts at a node j ∈ [n]
of Min, and first Min chooses to move a pawn to some node i ∈ [m] of Max,
via a weighted arc for which aij 6= −∞. In doing so, player Max receives the
payment −aij from Min. Then player Max chooses to move to some l ∈ [n] for
which bil 6= −∞. Player Max then receives a payment of bil from Player Min,
and then the game proceeds sequentially in turns. Player Max then wishes to
maximize the average reward per turn of the infinite trajectory thus created,
and Min wishes to minimize it.
Ehrenfeucht and Mycielski [9], who introduced this game, also showed that it
is equivalent to a finite game, which ends as soon as the trajectory forms a cycle.
In this finite game, we also assume that Max and Min play according to some
positional strategies: they choose in advance some mapping σ : [m] → [n] and
τ : [n] → [m] such that Max always moves the pawn from i ∈ [m] to σ(i) ∈ [n]
and Min moves the pawn from j ∈ [n] to τ(j) ∈ [m], so that biσ(i) 6= −∞ and
aτ(j)j 6= −∞ for all i ∈ [m] and j ∈ [n]. The two positional strategies form
a digraph, whose arc set is a subset of the edges in the original mean payoff
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game, with each node having a unique outgoing arc, either (i, σ(i)) or (j, τ(j))
(see, for example, [12]). The mean weight per turn of the first cycle formed by
the trajectory is then the reward of player Max, and the game is called winning
for Max if this reward is nonnegative. Max then wants to maximize his reward
by choosing a better positional strategy, and Min counterplays to minimize her
loss by choosing her positional strategy.
Note that the assumption written above guarantees that Max and Min have
at least one positional strategy that they can use.
The mathematical expression for the reward of Max in the finite mean-payoff
game starting at node j of Min, given that Max employs positional strategy σ
and Min employs positional strategy τ , is
ΦA,B(j, τ, σ) =
1
k
(
k∑
t=1
brtst − art+1st
)
, (8)
Here r1s1r2s2 . . . rkskr1 is the unique cycle formed by the trajectory, which
starts at a node j of Min and develops according to the positional strategies σ
and τ . It is assumed that rk+1 = r1
Ehrenfeucht and Mycielski [9] showed that such mean-payoff game (both the
infinite and the finite version of it) has value in pure strategies. The following
can be deduced from [9] and Gaubert and Gunawardena [10].
Proposition 2.2 ([9, 10]). There exist τ∗, σ∗ such that for all j = 1, . . . , n
min
τ∈T
ΦA,B(j, τ, σ
∗) = ΦA,B(j, τ∗, σ∗) = max
σ∈S
ΦA,B(j, τ
∗, σ), (9)
where T and S denote, respectively, the sets of positional strategies available to
Min and to Max. Moreover, ΦA,B(j, τ
∗, σ∗) = χj(A]B) for all j.
Finally, the relationship between mean-payoff games and the solvability of
tropical two-sided systems can be summarized in the following result.
Proposition 2.3 ([1] Theorem 3.1). For a finite mean payoff game, where
A,B ∈ Rm×nmax are doubly R-astic and σ∗ and τ∗ are equilibrium strategies, we
have ΦA,B(j, σ
∗, τ∗)(= χj(A]B)) ≥ 0 if and only if there exists x ∈ Rnmax such
that A⊗ x ≤ B ⊗ x and xj > −∞.
Let us now consider the following example of a mean payoff game.
Example 2.4. Let the matrices A,B, given by:
A =
 3 −∞7 −∞
−∞ 0
 and B =
 2 −∞−∞ 1
−3 4
 .
The two-sided system A ⊗ x ≤ B ⊗ x is given by the following system of in-
equalities:
3 + x1 ≤ 2 + x1
7 + x1 ≤ 1 + x2
x2 ≤ max(−3 + x1, 4 + x2).
(10)
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1
2
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−3
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0
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1
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1
Figure 1: The mean payoff game corresponding to system (10) and its restriction
We can immediately see from the first inequality that we cannot have a solution
with x1 > −∞. However, there is a solution (x1, x2) = (−∞, 0).
The corresponding game is given on Figure 1 (left). Here squares denote the
nodes at which Max makes a move and circles denote the nodes at which Min
makes a move.
Let players Max and Min choose positional strategies σ : 1→ 1, 2→ 2, 3→
2 and τ : 1→ 1, 2→ 3, respectively. The game is then played on a subgraph of
the graph of the mean-payoff game. This subgraph is shown on Figure 1 (right).
Clearly, the rewards of Max for the trajectories starting at the two nodes of
Min are:
ΦA,B(1, σ, τ) = −1, ΦA,B(2, σ, τ) = 4. (11)
Also, it can be checked that σ∗ = σ and τ∗ = τ is the equilibrium pair of
strategies of Max and Min, in the sense of the saddle point property (9). Thus,
the above rewards are the value of the game, and Max is winning if the game
starts at node 2 of Min but losing if the game starts at node 1 of Min. This
correlates with the fact that system (10) has a solution with x2 > −∞, but not
with x1 > −∞, as predicted by Proposition 2.3.
3. Mean-payoff game representation of pseudolinear optimization
3.1. Pseudolinear optimization over alcoved polyhedra
Consider the following problem.
Problem 3.1 (Pseudolinear optimization over alcoved polyhedra). Given U ∈
Rn×nmax , p, g ∈ Rnmax, q, h ∈ (R∪{+∞})n such that ρ(U) ≤ 0 and U ⊗ g ≤ h, find
min
x∈Rn
x− ⊗ p⊕ q− ⊗ x
subject to g ≤ x ≤ h
U ⊗ x ≤ x.
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and describe all x ∈ Rn for which the minimum is attained.
Note that whenever we have qi = +∞ it means that q−i = −∞, so that
xi does not appear in the objective function (but x
−
i still may appear when
pi 6= −∞). When hi = +∞, it means that xi is not bounded from above by
any constant, and if gi = −∞ then xi is not bounded from below.
Problem 3.1 was considered and solved by Krivulin [15], for the case of real q
and h. The solution set to the system of constraints in this problem is an alcoved
polyhedron. The geometry of such polyhedra is combining tropical and ordinary
convexity: see, e.g., Joswig and Kulas [13], or De La Puente and Claveria [7]
for a more recent reference.
It follows from the results of [15] that an alcoved polyhedron described by
P = {x : g ≤ x ≤ h, U ⊗ x ≤ x} (12)
is non-empty if and only if the conditions ρ(U) ≤ 0 and U∗ ⊗ g ≤ h hold. Note
that these are precisely the conditions that are assumed in Problem 3.1.
The proof of the proposition below is due to Krivulin [15], although the case
where some entries of h and q are equal to +∞ was not considered in that work.
See also Appendix of the present paper for a new alternative proof, which makes
use of the connection to mean-payoff games.
Proposition 3.1 ([15] Theorem 6). The optimal value of Problem 3.1 is
θ = (q− ⊗ U∗ ⊗ p)⊗ 12 ⊕ h− ⊗ U∗ ⊗ p⊕ q− ⊗ U∗ ⊗ g, (13)
If θ is finite then the solution set of this problem is
{U∗ ⊗ v : g ⊕ θ− ⊗ p ≤ v ≤ (U∗)# ⊗′ (θ ⊗ q ⊕′ h), v ∈ Rn}. (14)
3.2. Pseudolinear optimization as parametric MPG
The purpose of this section is to recast Problem 1.1 as a parametric mean-
payoff game. To begin, we can rewrite (1) in the following way, introducing new
variable λ:
min
x∈Rn,λ∈R
λ
subject to p ≤ λ⊗ x, q− ⊗ x ≤ λ,
U ⊗ x⊕ b ≤ V ⊗ x⊕ d.
(15)
Introducing z = (y t)T where y ∈ Rnmax and t ∈ Rmax, we see that a finite
solution to the system of constraints in (15) exists if and only if the following
parametric two-sided system
A⊗ z ≤ B(λ)⊗ z, (16)
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where
A =
 U b−∞ p
q− −∞
 and B(λ) =
 V dλ⊗ I −∞
−∞ λ
 , (17)
has a finite solution (z ∈ Rn+1).
Thus, we reformulate (1), as
min{λ ∈ R : A⊗ z ≤ B(λ)⊗ z is solvable with z ∈ Rn+1}, (18)
where A and B(λ) are given by (17).
We now reformulate this problem in terms of MPG, using Proposition 2.3,
by introducing the function Φ(λ) defined as the minimal value of the MPG
associated with the system A⊗ z ≤ B(λ)⊗ z:
min{λ ∈ R : Φ(λ) ≥ 0}, where Φ(λ) = min
i
χi(A
#B(λ)). (19)
We also define functions Φτ (λ) and Φ
σ(λ) corresponding to MPG where the
strategies of Min and Max are restricted to τ and σ respectively:
Φτ (λ) = min
i
χi(A
#
τ B(λ)), Φ
σ(λ) = min
i
χi(A
#Bσ(λ)) (20)
where
(Aτ )ij =
{
aij if i = τ(j)
−∞ otherwise. , (B
σ)ij =
{
bij if j = σ(i)
−∞ otherwise.
Proposition 2.2 then implies the following result:
Proposition 3.2. Let Σ be the set of all strategies of player Min and T is the
set of all strategies of player Max. Then
min
τ∈T
Φτ (λ) = Φ(λ) = max
σ∈Σ
Φσ(λ). (21)
The following elementary properties of Φ(λ), Φσ(λ) and Φτ (λ) are the same
as in [12][Theorem 8].
Proposition 3.3. For A and B(λ) given (17), functions Φ(λ), Φσ(λ) and
Φτ (λ) are non-decreasing, piecewise-linear and continuous.
3.3. MPG diagram of the problem
Analysing A and B(λ) of (17) we can build an MPG diagram corresponding
to this two-sided system, as shown on Figure 2. On this diagram we can see
three groups of square nodes of Max: [m], [n] and [1], with groups of arcs coming
in and out of them, corresponding to U ⊗ x ⊕ b ≤ V ⊗ x ⊕ d, p ≤ λ ⊗ x and
q− ⊗ x ≤ λ, respectively (where m,n and 1 indicate the numbers of nodes in
each group). Min has just two groups of circle nodes: [n] and [1], corresponding
to the variables and to the free-standing column, respectively. An arc between
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[m]
[n]
[1]
[1]
[n]
V
U#
d
b−
λI
p−
λ
q
Figure 2: MPG corresponding to tropical pseudolinear programming
two nodes of any two groups of nodes exists if and only if the corresponding
entry of the matrix or the vector, by which the group connection is marked, is
finite.
Using this MPG diagram we can establish the following optimality and un-
boundedness certificates for Problem 1.1, similar to Theorems 12 and 13 in [12].
Both certificates refer to some groups of nodes of Max shown on Figure 2. Their
proofs, being similar to those in [12], are deferred to Appendix.
Proposition 3.4 (Optimality certificate). λ∗ is optimal if and only if Φ(λ∗) ≥ 0
and there exists τ such that in the mean-payoff game defined by Aτ and B(λ
∗)
all cycles accessible from some node of Min have non-positive weights, and all
cycles of zero weight accessible from that node of Min contain a node of Max
that does not belong to the left group [m] of its nodes.
Proposition 3.5 (Unboundedness certificate). The problem is unbounded if and
only if, for some σ, all cycles of the graph defined by A and Bσ(0) contain nodes
of Max that are only from the [m] group (on the left) and have a nonnegative
weight.
We now consider the case when all data in the problems are integer.
Proposition 3.6. When the finite entries of p, q, U, b, V, d are all integer, the
optimal value of Problem 1.1, if finite, is an integer multiple of 1/2.
Proof. For the MPG on Figure 2, for each λ there is  > 0 in which
Φ(µ) = ΦA,B(µ)(j, σ, τ)
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for some j, τ and σ and all µ ∈ [λ− , λ]. This implies that
λ∗ = min{λ : ΦA,B(λ)(j, σ, τ) ≥ 0} = min{λ : kλ+ s ≥ 0},
for some j, σ, τ , k and s. Here we recall that ΦA,B(λ)(j, σ, τ) is the weight of a
cycle (divided by the number of turns). Inspecting Figure 2 we can see that a
cycle can collect no more than two repetitions of λ, hence in the above expression
for λ∗ we can have k equal to 1 or 2, which means that the denominator of the
optimal value is bounded by 2.
4. Bisection method
Since Φ(λ) is a non-decreasing function, we can use the bisection method
to find min{λ : Φ(λ) ≥ 0}. Recall that Φ(λ) ≥ 0 is equivalent to existence of
x ∈ Rn that solves
x− ⊗ p⊕ q− ⊗ x ≤ λ,
U ⊗ x⊕ b ≤ V ⊗ x⊕ d. (22)
In general, this method can be only approximate, but in the case of integer
input (i.e., when all finite entries of U , V, b, d, p, q are integer) it can be made
precise, since by Proposition 3.6 in this case the optimal λ is an integer multiple
of 1/2. In the description of the bisection method given below, rounding up
(d·e) means finding the least λ greater than or equal to the given number and
an integer multiple of 1/2. Similarly, rounding down (b·c) means finding the
biggest λ less than or equal to the given number and an integer multiple of 1/2.
Before we give a description of the bisection method, we need to have the
upper and the lower bounds, with which we can start.
Upper bound: Using an MPG solver such as described in [8] or [6], find
x ∈ Rn such that U ⊗ x⊕ b ≤ V ⊗ x⊕ d. Then compute
λ1(+) =
⌊
x− ⊗ p⊕ q− ⊗ x⌋ (23)
for this x. Then we know that Φ(λ+1 ) ≥ 0.
Lower bound: We define λ
(−)
1 as the optimal value of the unconstrained
problem
min
x∈Rn
x− ⊗ p⊕ q− ⊗ x.
Using the result of Krivulin [14][Theorem 4] (a slight extension to the case
q ∈ (R ∪ {+∞})n), we have
λ
(−)
1 = (q
− ⊗ p)⊗ 12 (24)
As this unconstrained problem is a relaxation of the problem in question, we
either have that Φ(λ
(−)
1 ) ≥ 0 and then λ(−)1 is the optimal value of the con-
strained problem, or we have Φ(λ
(−)
1 ) < 0 and then we continue with the bisec-
tion method. If q−⊗ p is finite, which we assume, then the problem is bounded
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Algorithm 1 Integer Bisection
Input: U , V , b, d, p with integer or −∞ entries, q with integer or +∞ entries.
1: Compute λ
(−)
1 by (24).
2: if Φ(λ
(−)
1 ) ≥ 0 then
3: Find a finite solution x to (22) with λ = λ
(−)
1 and return.
4: else
5: Compute λ
(+)
1 by (23) and proceed with k = 1.
6: end if
7: while λ
(−)
k < λ
(+)
k do
8: λk = (λ
(−)
k + λ
(+)
k )/2.
9: if Φ(λk) < 0 then
10: λ
(+)
k+1 = λ
(+)
k and λ
(−)
k+1 = dλke.
11: else
12: λ
(+)
k+1 = bλkc and λ(−)k+1 = λ(−)k .
13: end if
14: k = k + 1.
15: end while
16: Find a finite solution x to (22) with λ = λ
(+)
k = λ
(−)
k and return.
Output: (λ, x).
from below. Note that q− ⊗ p is finite if and only if there exists at least one i
such that both qi and pi are finite. We now describe the bisection algorithm.
It is clear that in this algorithm, for each λ+k we have Φ(λ
(+)
k ) ≥ 0, and for
each λ−k we have Φ(λ
(−)
k ) ≤ 0 and Φ(λ′) < 0 whenever λ′ < λ(−)k . This implies
that when λ = λ
(+)
k = λ
(−)
k , we indeed have Φ(λ) = 0 and Φ(λ
′) < 0 for any
λ′ < λ, so this λ is the optimal value of the problem.
Example 4.1. This example demonstrates that (q− ⊗ p)⊗1/2 does not always
work as a good lower bound. Consider a pseudolinear optimization problem
(Problem 1.1) with
U =
(
0 −∞
−∞ 0
)
, b =
( −∞
−∞
)
, V =
( −∞ 0
0 −∞
)
, d =
( −∞
−∞
)
,
p =
(
0
−∞
)
, q =
(
+∞
0
)
.
(25)
In this example, pi and qi are not finite at the same time for any i, so
(q− ⊗ p)⊗1/2 = −∞, but the problem is bounded and its optimal value is 0.
Indeed, we are seeking minimum over max(x−1 , x2) on the line x1 = x2, which
is equal to 0.
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5. Newton Iterations
5.1. Formulation
Let us begin this section by introducing the concepts of left-optimal strategy.
By the right-hand side of (21), Φ(·) is a pointwise maximum of a finite number
of functions Φσ(·), for σ ∈ Σ. Therefore, for each λ there exists Σ′ ⊆ Σ such
that Φσ(λ) = Φ(λ) for each σ ∈ Σ′. Furthermore, each of these Φσ(·) is a
piecewise-linear and continuous function, so there exists a small enough  > 0
such that each Φσ(·) with σ ∈ Σ′ is linear on [λ − , λ] and is bigger than any
Φσ(·) with σ /∈ Σ′. This implies that there exists σ∗ such that Φσ∗(µ) = Φ(µ)
for all µ ∈ [λ− , λ]. Such σ∗ is called a left-optimal strategy at λ. Left-optimal
strategies play the role of derivatives in Algorithm 2 stated below. Iterations of
this algorithm will refer to efficient solution of the following problem
min{λ : Φσ(λ) ≥ 0}, (26)
which will be explained in Subsection 5.3.
Algorithm 2 Newton iterations, left-optimal strategies
Input: U, V, b, d, p with entries in Rmax and q with entries in R ∪ {+∞}.
1: Set λ0 = +∞, compute λ1 by (23) and proceed with k = 1.
2: while λk < λk−1 do
3: Find a left-optimal strategy σk of Player Max at λk.
4: Solve (26) with σ = σk and let λk+1 be the optimal value of (26).
5: k = k + 1.
6: end while
7: Find a solution x ∈ Rn to system (22) with λ = λk.
Output: (λ, x).
The following result and its proof are similar to the corresponding statement
from Gaubert et al. [12], therefore the proof is omitted.
Proposition 5.1. Newton algorithm finds a solution of a tropical pseudoquadratic
optimisation problem in a finite number of steps, limited by the number of strate-
gies of player Max in the associated MPG.
In the general case (i.e., when the data are arbitrary real numbers) left-
optimal strategies can be found using the algebra of germs, for which we also
refer the reader to Gaubert et al. [12].
5.2. The case of integer data
In this section we will discuss how to implement Newton’s algorithm in the
case when all given data (i.e., coefficients of U , V , b, d, p and q) are integer.
We first explain how to find the left-optimal strategies in the case of integer
data. By the arguments similar to those of Proposition 3.6, λk appearing in
Newton iterations are of the form l/2 where l is an integer, while the breakpoints
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of Φ(λ) can be at rational points with denominators not exceeding 2(n+1). The
greatest denominator of a distance between λk and such a breakpoint is bounded
from above by 4(n + 1). Therefore, if we take  = 1/4(n + 1), we can be sure
that if σk is optimal at λk −  then it is optimal for any λ ∈ [λk − , λk], thus
left-optimal.
However, in the case of integer data, instead of finding a left-optimal strategy
we can find an optimal strategy σk at λ
[−]
k , defined as the largest multiple of
1/2 less than λk if it is not a multiple of 1/2 (which may happen if k = 1),
and as λk − 1/2 if it is. If we have Φσk(λ[−]k ) ≥ 0, then the Newton iterations
proceed, and if Φσk(λ
[−]
k ) < 0 then Φ(λ) < 0 for all λ < λk and we must stop.
So we have the following modification of Algorithm 2, where optimal strategies
can be found using some MPG solvers such as the algorithm by Dhingra and
Gaubert [8].
Algorithm 3 Integer Newton iterations
Input: U, V, b, d, p with integer or −∞ entries, and q with integer or +∞
entries.
1: Set λ0 = +∞, compute λ1 by (23) and proceed with k = 1.
2: while λk < λk−1 do
3: Compute λ
[−]
k and find an optimal strategy σk of player Max at λ
[−]
k .
4: Solve (26) with σ = σk and let λk+1 be the optimal value of (26).
5: k = k + 1.
6: end while
7: Find a finite solution x to system (22) with λ = λk−1.
Output: (λ, x).
Note that in this algorithm the sequence of λi is strictly decreasing until the
last step, at which we may have λk = λk−1, λk > λk−1 or even λk = +∞ if the
problem (26) is infeasible for σ = σk.
5.3. Finding the least zero of a partial spectral function
Here we discuss how to solve (26). The problem can be translated back to
two-sided system where it becomes the problem of finding
min{λ ∈ R : A⊗ z ≤ Bσ(λ)⊗ z has a solution z ∈ Rn+1}, (27)
where Bσ is the matrix with entries equal to bσij = bij when j = σ(i) and to
−∞ otherwise, and σ is the strategy of Max appearing in (26). Recalling (17),
we can rewrite (27) as
min
λ∈R, x∈Rn
λ s.t. p ≤ λ⊗ x, q− ⊗ x ≤ λ, U ⊗ x⊕ b ≤ V σ ⊗ x⊕ dσ. (28)
where (V σ dσ) = (V d)σ, and (V d)σ is defined as Bσ above: we leave the
entries of B for which j = σ(i) untouched and set all the remaining entries to
−∞. We now work with the system of constraints
U ⊗ x⊕ b ≤ V σ ⊗ x⊕ dσ. (29)
15
Proposition 5.2. System (29) is equivalent to
F ⊗ xJ ⊕G⊗ xJ ≤ xJ , lJ ≤ xJ ≤ uJ xJ ≤ uJ . (30)
and further to
R⊗ x ≤ x, l ≤ x ≤ u for R =
(
F G
−∞ −∞
)
(31)
for some set J ⊆ [n], its complement J = [n] \ J , matrices F,G, and vectors l
and u.
Proof. Define the index set J as follows:
J = {j ∈ [n] : σ(i) = j for some i}.
Now for any j ∈ J consider all i such that σ(i) = j. Denote the set of such
i by Ij and observe that
⋃
j∈J∪{n+1} Ij = [m]. We have two cases:
Case 1: j ∈ J . In this case we obtain
n⊕
k=1
(v−ij ⊗ uik ⊗ xk)⊕ v−ij ⊗ bi ≤ xj , j ∈ J, i ∈ Ij (32)
for all such i ∈ Ij , and summing it up over i ∈ Ij we have
n⊕
k=1
⊕
i∈Ij
(v−1ij ⊗ uik ⊗ xk)⊕
⊕
i∈Ij
(v−1ij ⊗ bi) ≤ xj , j ∈ J. (33)
Observe that (33) is equivalent to the system of inequalities (32) where i runs
over Ij , and equivalent to the subsystem of (29), consisting of inequalities i such
that σ(i) ∈ [n].
Case 2. j = n+ 1. In this case we obtain
n⊕
k=1
uik ⊗ xk ⊕ bi ≤ di, i ∈ In+1 (34)
for all i ∈ In+1. Considering these inequalities for all i ∈ In+1 and seeing that
bi ≤ di in this case is just a necessary condition for (29) to be consistent, we
see that the system of such inequalities taken over i ∈ In+1 is equivalent to the
system
xk ≤ min
i∈In+1
u−ik ⊗′ di. (35)
This is a system of upper bounds on xk (some of them can be equal to +∞ if
all the corresponding uik are −∞).
Equation (29) is thus equivalent to the system of (33) and (35). Combining
these two, one can easily recognize (30).
Next we observe that the constraint given by F ⊗ xI ⊕G⊗ xJ ≤ xI can be
written as [
F G
−∞ −∞
]
⊗
[
xI
xJ
]
≤
[
xI
xJ
]
which is equivalent to R⊗ x ≤ x.
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The above proposition implies that the problem which we have to solve at
each iteration is the following problem
min
x∈Rn
x− ⊗ p⊕ q− ⊗ x s.t. l ≤ x ≤ u and R⊗ x ≤ x. (36)
Recognizing Problem 3.1, we recall that Proposition 3.1 yields the optimal value
θ = (q− ⊗R∗ ⊗ p)⊗ 12 ⊕ u− ⊗R∗ ⊗ p⊕ q− ⊗R∗ ⊗ l (37)
and the solution set
x = {R∗ ⊗ v : l ⊕ θ− ⊗ p ≤ v ≤ (R∗)# ⊗′ (θ ⊗ q ⊕′ u), v ∈ Rn}. (38)
of this problem. Thus we can compute λk = θ using (37) and, at optimality we
can take any vector from (38) as a solution of the system of constraints in (28)
and hence also system (22) with λ = λk = θ. For a finite vector v we can take
a vector with the following components:
vi =

((R∗)# ⊗′ (θ ⊗ q ⊕′ u))i, if ((R∗)# ⊗′ (θ ⊗ q ⊕′ u))i 6= +∞,
li ⊕ θ− ⊗ pi, otherwise if li ⊕ θ− ⊗ pi 6= −∞,
0, otherwise.
Note that the computation of θ in (37) requires no more than O(n3) operations
and can be performed very efficiently by shortest path algorithms.
6. Example and numerical experiments
6.1. Example
Consider the pseudolinear optimization problem where
U =
( −∞ −2
3 −∞
)
, b =
( −∞
−∞
)
, V =
(
1 0
−∞ 1
)
, d =
( −∞
1
)
,
p =
(
0
−∞
)
, q =
( −1
0
)
.
(39)
6.1.1. Application of bisection (Algorithm 1)
Start: We first compute λ
(−)
1 = (q
− ⊗ p)⊗ 12 = 12 . We find that Φ(λ(−)1 ) =− 13 < 0, so we proceed. Using the alternating method of [6], we obtain a finite
solution x0 = (−8 −8)> for U⊗x⊕b ≤ V ⊗x⊕d. Let λ(+)1 = (x0)−⊗p⊕q−⊗x0 =
8.
Iterations: For k = 1, let λ1 =
λ
(+)
1 +λ
(−)
1
2 =
17
4 . Since Φ(λ1) = 2 > 0, set
λ
(+)
2 = bλ1c = 4 and λ(−)2 = λ(−)1 = 12 .
For k = 2, we check that λ
(+)
2 6= λ(−)2 and compute λ2 = λ
(+)
2 +λ
(−)
2
2 =
9
4 .
Since Φ(λ2) =
5
6 > 0, set λ
(+)
3 = bλ2c = 2 and λ(−)3 = λ(−)2 = 12 .
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For k = 3, we check that λ
(+)
3 6= λ(−)3 and compute λ3 = λ
(+)
3 +λ
(−)
3
2 =
5
4 .
Since Φ(λ3) =
1
6 > 0, set λ
(+)
4 = bλ3c = 1 and λ(−)4 = λ(−)3 = 12 .
For k = 4, we check that λ
(+)
4 6= λ(−)4 and compute λ4 = λ
(+)
4 +λ
(−)
4
2 =
3
4 .
Since Φ(λ4) = − 16 < 0, set λ(+)5 = λ(+)4 = 1 and λ(−)5 = dλ4e = 1.
We have λ
(−)
5 = λ
(+)
5 = 1, so we stop, this is the optimal value of the
problem. Using the alternating method, we obtain a finite solution x = (−1 1)T
for system (22) with λ = λ
(−)
5 = 1. Then return (λ
(−)
5 , x) as a solution of the
problem.
6.1.2. Application of Newton method (Algorithm 3)
Start. We begin with the same λ1 = 8 as in the bisection method.
Iterations: We first find an optimal strategy σ1 at λ
[−]
1 = 7.5 with σ1(1) =
1, σ1(2) = 3, where 1 and 2 are nodes of Max that correspond to the inequalitites
of the system U ⊗ x ⊕ b ≤ V ⊗ x ⊕ d (recall that Max does not have choice at
any other node of the associated MPG).
Following Proposition 5.2, we find that min{λ : Φσ1(λ) ≥ 0} is equivalent
to (36), where
R =
( −∞ −3
−∞ −∞
)
, l =
( −∞
−∞
)
, u =
( −2
+∞
)
.
Then we obtain
λ2 = (q
− ⊗R∗ ⊗ p)⊗ 12 ⊕ u− ⊗R∗ ⊗ p⊕ q− ⊗R∗ ⊗ l = 2.
At iteration 2 we check that λ2 < λ1 and find an optimal strategy σ2 at
λ
[−]
2 = 1.5 with σ2(1) = 2 and σ2(2) = 2. Following Proposition 5.2, we next
solve (36) with
R =
( −∞ −∞
2 −∞
)
, l =
( −∞
−∞
)
, u =
(
+∞
+∞
)
.
We obtain
λ3 = (q
− ⊗R∗ ⊗ p)⊗ 12 ⊕ u− ⊗R∗ ⊗ p⊕ q− ⊗R∗ ⊗ l = 1.
At iteration 3, we check that λ3 < λ2 and find an optimal strategy σ3 at
λ
[−]
3 = 0.5 with σ3(1) = 2 and σ3(2) = 2, which is the same as at the previous
iteration. Obviously, we obtain λ4 = 1 = λ3, so we stop. As σ2 = σ3 is an
optimal strategy also at λ3 = λ4 = 1, we can find a finite solution using
x = R∗ ⊗ ((R∗)] ⊗′ (θ ⊗ q ⊕′ u)) = (−1 1)>
and return λ = 1 and x = (−1 1)> as an optimal solution to the problem.
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Figure 3: Application of Newton method to the problem given by (39)
6.2. Numerical experiments
We implemented Algorithms 1 and 3 in MATLAB and ran some numerical
experiments. Before running these experiments we checked the percentage of
cases for which (q− ⊗ p)⊗1/2 (the optimal value of the unconstrained problem)
is an optimal value of the constrained problem so that no algorithm is required.
Before checking this, the program checked that the system of constraints is
feasible and (q−⊗ p)⊗1/2 is finite. For m = n ranging from 1 to 70 we ran 2000
experiments for each dimension for the cases where the entries are all finite
or we have approximately 30% of finite entries, and where the finite entries are
randomly and uniformly selected in the interval [−500, 500] or [−500000, 500000]
(for all four combinations). The results are shown on Figure 4. We see that, in
general, for very low dimensions it is highly likely that (q− ⊗ p)⊗1/2, but the
probability of this quickly falls to the level of 40% or slightly below, and then
starts to grow very slowly. We also observed how this percentage behaves for
dimensions up to 400 performing just 20 experiments for each dimension and
each situation, and recorded that (q−⊗p)⊗1/2 was optimal in 41% of all solvable
instances with finite q− ⊗ p.
We also performed similar experiments with rectangular matrices with 50
rows and number of columns ranging from 35 to 90, see Figure 5. Unlike in
the previous experiments, the results do not depend on the range of entries
or sparsity. The percentage of cases where (q− ⊗ p)⊗1/2 is optimal increases
monotonically from 15 − 20% for n = 35 to almost 100% when n = 90. Cases
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Figure 4: Percentage of the cases where (q− ⊗ p)⊗1/2 is an optimal value for m = n from 1
to 70. Finite entries are randomly picked from [−500, 500] (left) and from [−500000, 500000]
(right). Results for the cases where all entries are finite (in blue) are shown versus the cases
where approximately 30% of all entries are finite (red).
Figure 5: Percentage of the cases where (q− ⊗ p)⊗1/2 is an optimal value for m = 50 and n
from 35 to 90. Blue stars: all entries finite, drawn randomly and uniformly from [−500, 500].
Red stars: 30% of finite entries, drawn randomly and uniformly from [−500000, 500000].
n < 35 were not checked, because for such low n most of the randomly generated
constraint systems become infeasible.
Next, we checked the performance of Newton and bisection algorithms, in
the same vein as in Gaubert et al. [12]. In our experiments, U and V were square
matrices with dimensions ranging from 1 to 400, with the range of finite entries
[−500, 500] or [−500000, 500000], with finite entries only or with approximately
30% of finite entries. Results are shown in Figures 6 and 7. For each dimension,
both methods were run exactly once, after repeatedly ignoring the cases where
the system of constraints was infeasible or the value (q−⊗p)⊗1/2 was infinite or
optimal for the generated problem. We see that, as in the case of linear-fractional
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Figure 6: Number of iterations of bisection (yellow) and Newton iterations (blue) for randomly
generated problems of dimension 1 to 400 with the range of entries between −500 and 500
with finite entries only (left) and with approximately 30% of finite entries (right)
Figure 7: Number of iterations of bisection (yellow) and Newton iterations (blue) for randomly
generated problems of dimension 1 to 400 with the range of entries between −500000 and
500000 with finite entries only (left) and with approximately 30% of finite entries (right)
programming [12], the “average number” of Newton iterations (computed here
for dimension d as the average taken over dimensions in the range [d−10, d+10]
and shown by thick blue line) slowly grows with dimension and, in the case
of entries ranging in [−500, 500] becomes similar to the number of bisection
iterations before the dimension 400 is reached. Unlike in the case of linear-
fractional programming, here we were able to implement bisection also in the
case of sparse data (30% of finite entries). Similarly to [12], we observed that the
number of bisection iterations grows with the range of the finite entries (for an
obvious reason, since it means that the interval between lower and upper bounds
increases). In particular, the gap between bisection and Newton iterations still
remains quite big for d = 400 for [−500000, 500000]. However, the number
of bisection iterations also decreases with the increase in dimension: this is
different from what was observed in tropical linear-fractional programming [12]
where the number of these iterations was stable.
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Figure 8: MPG diagram corresponding to pseudoquadratic optimisation
7. Pseudoquadratic optimisation
In this section we will consider pseudoquadratic optimization problem with
two-sided constraints: Problem 1.2. Like Problem 1.1, which we considered
earlier, it can be also represented by parametric MPG and solved by means of
bisection and Newton methods, calling an MPG solver at each iteration. Below
we discuss the details of it, as well as similarity and difference between the
pseudoquadratic and pseudolinear tropical optimisation.
As a starter, using that x− ⊗ C ⊗ x ≤ λ is equivalent to C ⊗ x ≤ λ ⊗ x,
we can recast Problem 1.2 as the problem of finding the least λ such that
A⊗ z ≤ B(λ)⊗ z, is solvable with z ∈ Rn+1, where
A =

U b
C −∞
−∞ p
q− −∞
 and B(λ) =

V d
λ⊗ I −∞
λ⊗ I −∞
−∞ λ
 . (40)
The mean-payoff game diagram corresponding to this system is given on Fig-
ure 8. Comparing it with Figure 2, we see a new group of nodes [n] on top
of the diagram, corresponding to the inequalities C ⊗ x ≤ λ ⊗ x. With re-
spect to this game, we are solving the problem min{λ : Φ(λ) ≥ 0}, where
Φ(λ) = mini χi(A
]B(λ)), with A and B(λ) defined in (40). The theory of
Section 3.2 applies verbatim.
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It can be also checked that both certificates stated in Propositions 3.4 and
3.5 extend to the pseudoquadratic optimisation with no change, now referring to
the groups of nodes in Figure 8. However, in the pseudoquadratic programming
the cycles in the graph of the game can collect up to n + 1 repetitions of λ.
Therefore, in the case of integer data, we can only say that the denominator of
optimal value is bounded from above by n+1. The same is true for any reduced
MPG defined by A and Bσ(λ).
An initial upper bound for the bisection method, following Section 4, can be
computed as
λ
(+)
0 = x
− ⊗ C ⊗ x⊕ q− ⊗ x⊕ x− ⊗ p,
where x ∈ Rn is a solution to U⊗x⊕b ≤ V ⊗x⊕d. The lower bound comes from
the unconstrained pseudoquadratic problem minx∈Rn x−⊗C⊗x⊕q−⊗x⊕x−⊗p,
the optimal value of which was found by Krivulin [18] to be
λ
(−)
0 = ρ(C)⊕ (q− ⊗ p)⊗1/2.
With these initial bounds we can run a usual bisection scheme as an approximate
method, or we can still use Algorithm 1 as its exact version, but rounding up
(d·e) now means finding the least rational number greater than or equal to the
given number and with denominator bounded by n + 1. Similarly, rounding
down (b·c) means finding the biggest rational number less than or equal to the
given one and with denominator bounded by n + 1. These operations are still
not too difficult: suppose that λ is not a integer and set λ = a+ cb , where a ∈ Z,
b ∈ N, c ∈ N ∪ {0} and cb is an irreducible proper fraction if c 6= 0. Then we
have
dλe =
{
λ, if c = 0 or b ≤ n+ 1,
a+ e1d1 , otherwise,
bλc =
{
λ, if c = 0 or b ≤ n+ 1,
a+ e2d2 , otherwise,
(41)
where
e1
d1
= min
{
dd cd+1b ee
d
: 1 ≤ d ≤ n+ 1
}
, (42)
and
e2
d2
= max
{
bb cd−1b cc
d
: 1 ≤ d ≤ n+ 1
}
, (43)
and dd·ee and bb·cc, respectively, mean the usual operations of rounding up and
rounding down to the nearest integers, respectively.
We also have Newton iterations (Algorithm 2) based on left-optimal strate-
gies, which are found using the algebra of germs in general case. In the case of
integer data, the denominators of λk do not exceed n+ 1 and the denominators
of breakpoints of Φ(λ) do not exceed (n+1)2. Hence the largest possible denom-
inator of the distance between λk and a breakpoint does not exceed (n+ 1)
3, so
we can take  = 1/(n+ 1)3 to ensure that a strategy that is optimal at λ−  is
optimal for the whole interval [λ− , λ].
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Integer version of Newton iterations (Algorithm 3) also works, but in this
algorithm λ[−] should be defined as the largest rational number that is 1) strictly
smaller than λ, 2) has a denominator bounded by n+ 1. Following the notation
in (41), we can obtain:
λ[−] =
{
λ− 1n+1 , if λ is integer,
a+ e2d2 , otherwise,
(44)
where e2d2 is defined as in (43).
Solution of (26) is an important ingredient in any modification of Newton
algorithm. This is treated exactly as in Section 5.3, since C ⊗ x ≤ λ ⊗ x does
not add to the available strategies of Max, and they are still determined by the
right-hand side of the system U ⊗x⊕ b ≤ V ⊗x⊕ d. Proposition 5.2 then leads
us to a problem of the following type:
min
x∈Rn
x− ⊗ p⊕ q− ⊗ x⊕ x− ⊗ C ⊗ x
s.t. l ≤ x ≤ u and R⊗ x ≤ x.
(45)
An explicit expression for the optimal value of this problem and solution set
was obtained in Krivulin [16][Theorem 4] and it can be used instead of (37)
and (38). However, the computational complexity of computing the optimal
value of this problem rises to O(n5).
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 3.1
We first represent Problem 3.1 equivalently as
min
x∈Rn,λ∈R
{λ : x− ⊗ p⊕ q− ⊗ x ≤ λ, g ≤ x ≤ h, U ⊗ x ≤ x}. (A.1)
By multiplying the inequality U⊗x ≤ x by U , we deduce that U⊗2⊗x ≤ U⊗
x ≤ x, and hence, by continuing to multiply the inequality by U we determine
that U∗ ⊗ x ≤ x. Conversely, U∗ ⊗ x ≤ x implies that U ⊗ x ≤ x. Hence, we
can restate (A.1) as follows
min
x∈Rn,λ∈R
{λ : p ≤ λ⊗ x, q− ⊗ x ≤ λ, g ≤ x, h− ⊗ x ≤ 0, U∗ ⊗ x ≤ x}.
(A.2)
Figure A.9 provides a mean-payoff game representation of this problem.
Here, the group of n nodes of Min (in a circle) corresponds to n variables and
the lone-standing node of Min (circle in the bottom) corresponds to the free
column. There are two individual nodes of Max corresponding to q− ⊗ x ≤ λ
and h− ⊗ x ≤ 0. The remaining 3n nodes of Max are split into three groups
of n nodes: 1) the group on the top (U∗ ⊗ x ≤ x), 2) the group on the left
(g ≤ x) and 3) the group on the right (p ≤ λ⊗ x). It is also agreed that an arc
between two nodes exists if and only if the corresponding entry of the vector or
the matrix marking the corresponding group of arcs on the diagram is finite.
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Figure A.9: The parametric mean-payoff game corresponding to (A.2)
Observe that at every node at which player Max is active, there is no choice
to make as there is only one arc leaving that node. Also, let j′ be the node
(of one of the [n] groups of nodes of Max on the left and on the right) chosen
by Min at the bottom node (corresponding to the free column). Assuming this
choice of Min and examining the mean-payoff game diagram we see that the
total weight of any cycle can be written as si1i2 + ...+ siki1 , where
sij ∈
{
{−u∗ji} if j 6= j′
{−u∗j′i, qi − pj′ + 2λ, qi + λ− gj′ , hi + λ− pj′ , hi − g′j} if j = j′,
(A.3)
where the above possibilities for sij are valid only if all matrix and vector entries
that take part in them are finite. Hence we obtain that the optimal value of
(A.2) is equal to the least value of λ such that
0 ≤ min
j′
min
i1,...,ik
{si1i2 + ...siki1} (A.4)
where sij can take the values described in (A.3).
As at every node of player Max there is no choice, we can delete these
nodes and aggregate the weights. Also, we can omit the cycles whose weights
are composed entirely from the entries of (U∗)], as these cycle weights do not
depend on λ and are nonnegative. We are then left with the cycles that go
through the node of Min in the bottom of the diagram and hence also through
j′. Note that, as node j′ can appear in a cycle only once, there will be at most
one occurrence of the second case, where all terms except for the first one come
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from the arcs in the lower part of the diagram (going to node n+ 1 of Min and
back). All other sij can be compressed to an entry of (U
∗)] by using inequality
u∗i1i2 + ...+ u
∗
ik−1ik ≤ u∗i1ik ,
valid since (U∗)⊗(k−1) = U∗ for each k > 1. Thus we have to consider all
3-cycles of the following form:
i
j′
1
w1
w2
−u∗ij′
Here w1 +w2 is one of the finite values in {gi − pj′ + 2λ, qi + λ− gj′ , hi + λ−
pj′ , hi − gj′}, and i is such that u∗ij′ and one of these values are finite.
So we need to find the minimal λ such that:
1. −u∗ij′+qi−pj′+2λ ≥ 0 for all i and j′ such that u∗ij′ , qi and pj′ are finite:
this is equivalent to λ ≥ (q− ⊗ U∗ ⊗ p)⊗ 12 ;
2. −u∗ij′ + qi +λ− gj′ ≥ 0 for all i and j′ such that u∗ij′ , qi and gj′ are finite:
equivalent to λ ≥ q− ⊗ U∗ ⊗ g;
3. −u∗ij′ +hi+λ−pj′ ≥ 0 for all i and j′ such that u∗ij′ , hi and pj′ are finite:
equivalent to λ ≥ h− ⊗ U∗ ⊗ p;
4. −u∗ij′ + hi − gj′ ≥ 0 for all i and j′ such that u∗ij′ , hi and gj′ are finite:
this is always satisfied by the problem assumption U∗ ⊗ g ≤ h.
Hence the optimal value of λ is equal to (q−⊗U∗⊗p)⊗ 12⊕h−⊗U∗⊗p⊕q−⊗U∗⊗g,
as claimed.
We now deduce the representation of solution set (this part of the proof is
similar to that of Krivulin [15], Theorem 6). The solution set is given by the
same inequalities as in (A.1) but for the optimal value λ = θ, so it is the (finite
part of the) alcoved polyhedron described by the following inequalities:
x− ⊗ p ≤ θ, q− ⊗ x ≤ θ
g ≤ x, x ≤ h,
U ⊗ x ≤ x
(A.5)
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The first inequality can be rewritten as p ≤ θx and the second inequality can be
rewritten as x ≤ θq, and then the first four inequalities of (A.5) can be merged
into
g ⊕ θ− ⊗ p ≤ x ≤ θ ⊗ q ⊕′ h. (A.6)
It remains to prove that a finite x satisfies (A.6) and U ⊗ x ≤ x if and only if x
is as in (14).
Assume first that a finite x satisfies (A.6) and U ⊗ x ≤ x. The latter
inequality is equivalent to U∗ ⊗ x = x, and therefore from the right-hand side
of (A.6) we have U∗ ⊗ x ≤ θ ⊗ q ⊕′ h and, using Proposition 2.1, x ≤ (U∗)] ⊗′
(θ ⊗ q ⊕′ h). As we also have x ≥ g ⊕ θ− ⊗ p from the left-hand side of (A.6),
we obtain that x = U∗ ⊗ v, where v = x satisfies
g ⊕ θ− ⊗ p ≤ x = v ≤ (U∗)] ⊗′ (θ ⊗ q ⊕′ h),
hence x is in (14).
Now assume that x is as in (14). Since x = A∗ ⊗ v and A ⊗ A∗ ≤ A∗, it
satisfies A ⊗ x ≤ x. Since v is finite, x = U∗ ⊗ v is also finite. We also have
g ⊕ θ− ⊗ p ≤ x since U∗ ⊗ v ≥ v, and x = U∗ ⊗ v ≤ θ ⊗ q ⊕′ h follows by
Proposition 2.1.
Appendix B. Proofs of optimality and unboundedness certificates
The proofs written below work both in pseudolinear and in pseudoquadratic
case.
Appendix B.1. Proof of Proposition 3.4
λ∗ is optimal if and only if Φ(λ∗) = 0 and Φ(λ) < 0 for all λ < λ∗. By the left-
hand side of (21), Φ(·) is a pointwise minimum of a finite number of continuous
non-decreasing functions Φτ (·). Therefore, the above property implies that λ∗
is optimal if and only if there exists a strategy τ of Min such that Φτ (λ
∗) = 0
and Φτ (λ) < 0 for all λ < λ
∗. We can further find j and small enough  such
that Φτ (λ) = χj(A
]
τB(λ)) = aλ+ b for all λ ∈ [λ∗ − , λ] and some a > 0.
Since χj(A
]
τB(λ)) is the maximal cycle mean (per turn) over all the cycles
accessible from the node j of Min in the reduced game defined by Aτ and B,
having Φτ (λ
∗) = 0 means that in the mean-payoff game defined by Aτ and
B(λ∗) all cycles accessible from the node j of Min have non-positive weight and
at least one of them has zero weight. Furthermore, χj(A
]
τB(λ)) = aλ + b with
some a > 0 and b for all λ ∈ [λ∗ − , λ∗] if and only if all cycles of zero weight
accessible from the node j of Min contain one of the nodes of player Max that
is not from the [m] group on the left of Figure 2 or Figure 8. Thus we have
deduced that existence of a strategy τ with the claimed properties is equivalent
to the optimality of λ∗.
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Appendix B.2. Proof of Proposition 3.5
The problem is unbounded if and only if Φ(λ) ≥ 0 for all λ ∈ R. Since
Φ(λ) = maxσ Φ
σ(λ), this condition is equivalent to the following:
∀λ ∈ R ∃σ s.t. Φσ(λ) ≥ 0, (B.1)
which can occur if and only if there exist σ and λ′ ∈ R such that Φσ(λ) = a
for all λ ≤ λ′ and some constant a ≥ 0 since function Φσ(λ) is non-decreasing,
piecewise-linear and continuous, which also yields that such σ can make Φ(λ) ≥
0 hold for all λ ∈ R. Thus condition (B.1) can equivalently be written as:
∃σ s.t. Φσ(λ) ≥ 0 ∀λ ∈ R. (B.2)
Now we use that Φσ(λ) = min
i
χi(A
]Bσ(λ)) = min
i
min
τ
ΦA,B(λ)(i, τ, σ) to rewrite
the above condition as follows:
∃σ s.t. ∀i, ∀τ ΦA,B(λ)(i, τ, σ) ≥ 0 ∀λ ∈ R, (B.3)
which is equivalent to saying that the weights of all cycles in the digraph defined
by A and Bσ(λ) are nonnegative and cannot contain λ. Obviously, this condition
does not depend on the value of λ, which can be set to 0 as in the claim.
Note that the weight of a cycle must contain λ if and only if such cycle
contains a node of Max, which is not from the [m] group (on the left of Figure 2
or 8) since any other node of Max has unique outgoing arc with weight λ.
Therefore, condition (B.3) holds if and only if any cycle is avoiding these nodes
of Max and all cycles have a nonnegative weight.
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